(a) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3) and (d):

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(1) Automated Records and Consummated Orders System/Diversion Analysis and Detection System (ARCOS/DADS) (Justice/DEA-003)

(2) Controlled Substances Act Registration Records (Justice/DEA-005)

(3) Registration Status/Investigatory Records (Justice/DEA-012)

(b) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of the disclosure accounting would enable the subject of an investigation to gain valuable information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation and seriously hamper the regulatory functions of the DEA.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to records contained in these systems may provide the subject of an investigation information that could enable him to avoid compliance with the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-513).

(c) Systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) of this section are exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2) from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g) of 5 U.S.C. § 552a. In addition, systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (5) of this section are also exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) from subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); and (e)(1):

(1) Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA-001).

(2) Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA-002).

(3) Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA-010).

(4) Operation Files (Justice/DEA-011).

(5) Security Files (Justice/DEA-013).

(6) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA-014).

(d) Exemptions apply to the following systems of records only to the extent that information in the systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2): Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA-001); Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA-002); Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA-010); and Security Files (Justice/DEA-013). Exemptions apply to the Operations Files (Justice/DEA-011) only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2). Exemptions apply to the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA-014) only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2). Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting would provide to the subjects of an investigation significant information concerning the nature of the investigation and thus would present the same impediments to law enforcement as those enumerated in paragraph (d)(3) regarding exemption from subsection (d).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that it is not applicable because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) because access to records in this system of records would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. Specifically, it could inform the record subject of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory investigation of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Similarly, it may alert collateral suspects yet unprosecuted in closed cases. It could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the life, health, or physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony; or it may simply reveal a sensitive investigative technique. In addition, granting access to such information could result in the disclosure of confidential/security-sensitive or other information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. From the amendment provisions of subsection (d) because amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the DEA for the following reasons:

(i) It is not possible to detect relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a civil, criminal or other law enforcement investigation, case, or matter, including investigations during which DEA may obtain properly classified information. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established.

(ii) During the DEA’s investigative activities DEA may detect the violation of either drug-related or non-drug related laws. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that DEA retain all information obtained because it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies or otherwise assist such agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities. Such information may include properly classified information, the retention of which could be in the interests of national defense and/or foreign policy.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(i) The subject of an investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of an investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to improperly influence witnesses, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(ii) In certain circumstances the subject of an investigation cannot be required to provide information to investigators, and information relating to a subject’s illegal acts must be obtained from other sources.

(iii) In any investigation it is necessary to obtain evidence from a variety of sources other than the subject of the investigation in order to verify the evidence necessary for successful prosecution.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety or either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(e) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d)(1) and (e)(1):

(1) Grants of Confidentiality Files (GCF) (Justice/DEA-017), and

(2) DEA Applicant Investigations (Justice/DEA-018).

(f) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exception pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a grant of confidentiality with DEA. By permitting access to information which may reveal the identity of the source of that information—after a promise of confidentiality has been given—DEA would breach the promised confidentiality. Ultimately, such breaches would restrict the free flow of information which is vital to a determination of an applicant’s qualifications for a grant.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluation purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other apparently irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of an applicant which assists in determining whether a grant of confidentiality is warranted.

(g) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g): El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Seizure System (ESS) (JUSTICE/DEA-022). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement and counter-drug purposes of this system, and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the DEA in its sole discretion.

(h) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would potentially reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants. Similarly, disclosing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing investigatory efforts by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counter-drug and criminal investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants; or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected criminal or terrorist. Also, it may not always be known what information will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response or on-going investigation.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement and counter-drug efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counter-drug investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety of either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic record systems and therefore it is not possible for the DEA and EPIC to vouch for their compliance with this provision. In addition, EPIC supports but does not conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to illegal drug and other criminal activities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct counter-drug investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement and counter-drug purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies’ trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. EPIC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that ESS data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. ESS is also exempt from the requirements of subsection (e)(5) in order to prevent the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the ESS. ESS records are exempt from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of investigations. Exempting ESS from subsection (e)(5) serves to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record’s accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the DEA and EPIC and could alert the subjects of counter-drug, counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known. Additionally, compliance could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(i) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), (H), (I), (5), and (8); (f); (g); and (h): Investigative Reporting and Filing System (IRFS) (JUSTICE/DEA-008). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), or (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement or counterterrorism purposes of this system, or the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the DEA in its sole discretion.

(j) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to provide a record subject with an accounting of disclosure of records in this system could impede or compromise an ongoing investigation, interfere with a law enforcement activity, lead to the disclosure of properly classified information which could compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy, invade the privacy of a person who provides information in connection with a particular investigation, or result in danger to an individual’s safety, including the safety of a law enforcement officer.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4).

(3) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the system could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of confidential witnesses and informants, or of the investigative interest of the DEA; lead to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal the details of a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique, or the identity of a confidential source; or otherwise impede, compromise, or interfere with investigative efforts and other related law enforcement and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure could invade the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life, health, and physical safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, witnesses, and potential crime victims. Access to records could also result in the release of information properly classified pursuant to Executive order, thereby compromising the national defense or foreign policy.

(4) From subsection (d)(2) because amendment of the records thought to be incorrect, irrelevant, or untimely would also interfere with ongoing investigations, criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings, and other law enforcement activities; would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised; and may impact information properly classified pursuant to Executive order.

(5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) From subsection (e)(1) because, in the course of its acquisition, collation, and analysis of information under the statutory authority granted to it, an agency may occasionally obtain information, including information properly classified pursuant to Executive order, that concerns actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority, or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. It is impossible to determine in advance what information collected during an investigation will be important or crucial to the investigation and the apprehension of fugitives. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information in this system of records because it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies. This consideration applies equally to information acquired from, or collated or analyzed for, both law enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. foreign intelligence community and military community.

(7) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation, prosecution, or proceeding, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation, prosecution, or proceeding would be placed on notice as to the existence and nature of the investigation, prosecution, and proceeding and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony. Moreover, thorough and effective investigation and prosecution may require seeking information from a number of different sources.

(8) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants and endanger their lives, health, and physical safety. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative techniques and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(9) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act, and from subsection (e)(4)(I) to preclude any claims that the Department must provide more detail regarding the record sources for this system than the Department publishes in the system of records notice for this system. Exemption from providing any additional details about sources is necessary to preserve the security of sensitive law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the DEA; and further, greater specificity of properly classified records could compromise national security.

(10) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and analysis of information for criminal law enforcement purposes from various agencies does not permit a determination in advance or a prediction of what information will be matched with other information and thus whether it is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, and government attorneys to exercise their judgment in collating and analyzing information and would impede the development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(11) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, evidence, or interest, and by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas; could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts; and would pose an impossible administrative burden on the maintenance of these records and the conduct of the underlying investigations.

(12) From subsections (f) and (g) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(13) From subsection (h) when application of this provision could impede or compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, interfere with a law enforcement activity, reveal an investigatory technique or confidential source, invade the privacy of a person who provides information for an investigation, or endanger law enforcement personnel.

[Order No. 88-94, 59 FR 29717, June 9, 1994, as amended by Order No. 127-97, 62 FR 2903, Jan. 21, 1997; Order No. 009-2003, 68 FR 14140, Mar. 24, 2003; 72 FR 54825, Sept. 27, 2007; CPCLO Order No. 002-2013, 78 FR 14672, Mar. 7, 2013]