§ 1.  Applicability of Rules of Evidence

In the federal courts and in most states, rules of evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings except with respect to claims of privilege.{footnote}FRE 1101(d)(2).
Ariz. R. Evid. 1101(d); Ark. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Colo. R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); Del. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Hawaii R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); Iowa R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); Me. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Mich. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Miss. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1101(4); N.H. R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); N.C. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); N.D. R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 1101(c)(2); Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Vt. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Wash. R. Evid. 1101(c)(2); W.V. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 911.01(4)(b); Wyo. R. Evid. 1101(b)(2).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 345 (1974) (in dictum, writing that although rules of evidence are inapplicable to grand jury proceedings, privileges must be honored; holding exclusionary rule may not be invoked by grand jury witness).
Contra Alaska R. Evid. 101; 12 Okla. Stat. § 2103; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020.{/footnote}

§ 2.  Secrecy

Maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is fundamental to the American system of criminal justice.{footnote}Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).{/footnote}  Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth a general rule of secrecy, but also provides that grand jury material may be disclosed "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."{footnote}Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).{/footnote}  The disclosure of grand jury material is "left to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion."{footnote}In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Miller Brewing Co., 687 F.2d 1079, 1088 (7th Cir. 1982).
See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940) (“…[A]fter the grand jury’s functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.”){/footnote}

§ 3.  Testimony Used to Refresh Recollection or Impeach

A witness’ testimony before the grand jury may be used to refresh the witness’ recollection at trial.{footnote}United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940).
See also Procter & Gamble v. United States, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (dictum) ("[P]roblems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility . . ." are "cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly."){/footnote}  Such testimony may also be used to impeach the witness.{footnote}United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
See also Procter & Gamble v. United States, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (dictum) ("[P]roblems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility . . ." are "cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly.").{/footnote} Where a witness’s grand jury testimony is being offered to impeach the witness’s trial testimony, it is not hearsay.{footnote}CHECK Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).
See also Marshall v. U.S., 623 A.2d 551, 554-55 (D.C. 1992) (prosecution entitled to impeach its own witness who exonerated the defendant with grand jury testimony identifying defendant as shooter at scene of crime).{/footnote}  It is "standard practice" for the prosecution to impeach a witness at trial with grand jury testimony.{footnote}1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal § 107, p. 254 (2d ed. 1982).{/footnote} A criminal accused is likewise entitled to impeach prosecution witness’ with their grand jury testimony.{footnote}Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, Advisory Committee Notes (one of the purposes of mandatory recording of grand jury proceedings is to ensure defendant may impeach a prosecution witness with any inconsistent statements), cited in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 72 F.3d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1995).
But see United States v. Hoyos, 3 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993) (defendant not permitted to use prosecution witness’ grand jury testimony on cross-examination where it was not inconsistent with witness’ testimony and was outside the scope of the direct examination).{/footnote} A witness’ exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination in grand jury proceedings is generally held inadmissible at trial, {footnote}United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 946 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d at 931 (reversible error where witness’ testimony crucial to the defense).{/footnote} as is the exercise of the marital privilege.{footnote}United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1342 (4th Cir. 1993).{/footnote}

§ 3.  Testimony As Hearsay

Grand jury testimony only constitutes hearsay if it is being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  In such cases, it may be admissible under the exception for "former testimony" or the "residual exception.”

§ 3(a).  The "Former Testimony" Exception

Some courts have held testimony before a grand jury admissible under the "former testimony" exception, {footnote}United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1978).
See also United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th CIr. 1979) (noting that disctrict court "might" have admitted grand jury testimony under this exception).
Contra United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1st Cir. 1990).

CHECK People v. Lint, 182 Cal. App. 2d 402 (1960).

            {/footnote} See also TESTIMONY–Grand Jury Testimony.  For grand jury testimony to be admissible under this exception, the proponent must show that the adverse party in the prior proceeding had an opportunity and a similar motive to cross-examine the witness.  Thus, where a witness gave testimony favorable to the defense before the grand jury, but asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid testifying at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecution had a similar motive to cross-examine the witness before the grand jury.{footnote}United States v. Salerno, 112 S.Ct. 2508, 2509 (1992).
            See also United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that testimony properly excluded); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding abuse of discretion in exclusion of grand jury testimony offered by defendant where government had similar motive to examine witness because issue before grand jury and before trial court was the same: the defendant’s guilt or innocence).
           
{/footnote}
  

§ 3(b).  The Residual Exception

Grand jury testimony has also been held admissible under the residual, or catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.{footnote}United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316-17 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 654-55 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 280-81 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325, 327-28 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843 (1988); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 960-65 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-60 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 762-65 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987).
CHECK Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).
But see McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (J. Stewart and J. Marshall dissenting from denial of certiorari because of a difference among the courts of appeals on the admissibility of grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5)). United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that Donlon had effectively been overruled by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), which held that statements admitted under the residual exception are presumptively unreliable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1463 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that testimony not shown to be suficiently trustworthy).
Contra United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir.) (dictum) (generally not admissible), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1989) (“only extraordinarily trustworthy grand-jury testimony could possibly be admissible as proof of the matter asserted” under residual exception).{/footnote}

§ 4.  Other Grounds for Exclusion

A defendant’s grand jury testimony is not rendered inadmissible by the government’s failure to comply with Justice Department guidelines which require giving suspects a "target warning."{footnote}United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987).{/footnote}  The use of leading questions does not render grand jury testimony inadmissible at trial.{footnote}United States v. Champion Int’l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 19–).{/footnote}