a. (1) Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber-harassment, and who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” as defined by the provisions of subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C. 2C:25-19), may, except as provided in subsection b. of this section, file an application with the Superior Court pursuant to the Rules of Court alleging the commission of such conduct or attempted conduct and seeking a temporary protective order.

As used in this section and in sections 3, 4, and 8 of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-15, C.2C:14-16, and C. 2C:14-20):

“Sexual contact” means an intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.

“Sexual penetration” means vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor’s instruction.

“Lewdness” means the exposing of the genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person.

“Intimate parts” means the following body parts: sexual organs, genital area, anal area, inner thigh, groin, buttock or breast of a person.

“Stalking” means purposefully or knowingly engaging in a course of conduct directed at or toward a person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for the reasonable person’s own safety or the safety of a third person, or suffer other emotional distress, because the conduct involves: repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about a person, or interfering with a person’s property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or towards a person.

“Repeatedly” means on two or more occasions.

“Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress.

“Cause a reasonable person to fear” means to cause fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.

“Cyber-harassment” means conduct that occurs, while making one or more communications in an online capacity via any electronic device or through a social networking site and with the purpose to harass another, that involves: threatening to inflict injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person; knowingly sending, posting, commenting, requesting, suggesting, or proposing any lewd, indecent, or obscene material to or about a person with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm to the reasonable person; or threatening to commit any crime against a person or the person’s property.

(2) Except as provided in subsection b. of this section, an application for relief under P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.) may be filed by the alleged victim’s parent or guardian on behalf of the alleged victim in any case in which the alleged victim:

(a) is less than 18 years of age; or

(b) has a developmental disability as defined in section 3 of P.L.1977, c.200 (C. 5:5-44.4) or a mental disease or defect that renders the alleged victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of the alleged victim’s conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or of understanding the nature of the alleged conduct that is the subject of the application.

b. (1) When it is alleged that nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber-harassment has been committed by an unemancipated minor, an applicant seeking a protective order shall not proceed under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.), but may seek a protective order and other relief under the “New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice,” P.L.1982, c.77 (C. 2A:4A-20 et seq.) by filing a complaint pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C. 2A:4A-30).

(2) When it is alleged that nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber-harassment has been committed against an unemancipated minor by a parent, guardian, or other person having care, custody and control of that child as defined in R.S.9:6-2, an applicant seeking a protective order shall not proceed under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.), but shall report the incident to the Department of Children and Families for appropriate action.

c. (1) An applicant may seek a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.) and the court may issue such an order regardless of whether criminal charges based on the incident were filed and regardless of the disposition of any such charges.

(2) The filing of an application pursuant to this section shall not prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, or the institution or maintenance of a criminal prosecution based on the same act.

d. The court shall waive any requirement that the applicant’s or alleged victim’s place of residence appear on the application.

e. An applicant may seek a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.) in a court having jurisdiction over the place where the alleged conduct or attempted conduct occurred, where the respondent resides, or where the alleged victim resides or is sheltered.

f. No fees or other costs shall be assessed against an applicant for seeking a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C. 2C:14-13 et al.).

L.2015, c.147, s.2; amended 2016, c.93, s.1; 2023, c.127, s.2.